Lewis Dijkstra (p), Andres Rodriguez-Pose

Maria Abreu

Over the last decade, political parties opposed to EU integration have almost doubled their votes. The general opinion of the EU has also deteriorated, revealing a growing number of people who distrust the Union. To understand this development, this paper focuses on the geography of EU discontent. For the first time, it maps the vote against EU integration in the last national elections across more than 63 000 electoral districts in each of the 28 EU Member States. It assesses whether a range of factors considered to have fostered the surge in populism have had an impact on anti-EU voting. Research into populism often relies on the individual characteristics of anti-system voters: older, working-class, male voters on low incomes and with few qualifications to cope with the challenges of a modern economy. The results show that economic and industrial decline are driving the anti-EU vote. Areas with lower employment rates or with a less-educated workforce are also more likely to vote anti-EU. Once these factors have been taken into account, many of the purported causes of the geography of discontent either matter much less than expected or their impact varies depending on the strength of opposition to the European project.

Vera Hoogenboom, Eveline Van Leeuwen (p), Solmaria Halleck Vega

Lewis Dijkstra

The last years the population in most European countries has been declining. In the Netherlands, the total population is still growing but has many regions that are declining. In the Netherlands growing and shrinking regions are close to each other. Inhabitants of shrinking regions are therefore fearful of the consequences of the population decline. The livability can be compromised by the decline of the population in that region. Inhabitants of shrinking region have less trust in the national politics as these regions feel abandoned and not heard. Less trust in the national politics can lead to populistic voting. As populistic voting is a vote against the current “elite” establishment. People who vote populistic are not satisfied with the living situation. As livability can be compromised by population decline, the inhabitants of shrinking regions can vote more populistic than inhabitants of growing regions. This research answers the question: Do inhabitants of shrinking regions in the Netherlands vote more populistic at the national elections when controlling for socio-demographic and economic factors? The voting data of the national elections is collected from the polling stations of the years 2012 and 2017. The socio-demographic and economic factors of the districts are gathered for the years 2012 and 2016. Three models have been developed on the data, a model for the voting year 2012, 2017 and the difference between 2012 and 2017. The data is clustered on district level, where additional data has been added at the municipality level. A linear regression shows that there is a relationship between populistic voting and people living in shrinking regions. Livability is determined as accessibility, distance to facilities and commitment to the region. When there is a community feeling within the region, the inhabitants vote less populistic. The results show that investing in the livability of shrinking regions can make inhabitants vote less populistic. The politician of the Dutch government can make the inhabitants of shrinking regions feel more heard, so these inhabitants will feel more included to the politics and the country.

Maria Abreu (p), Calvin Jones

Eveline Van Leeuwen

A wave of recent electoral shocks has highlighted the presence of significant regional disparities in electoral outcomes. Few are as remarkable as the result of the UK’s EU referendum in Wales, given the nation’s very significant share of EU structural funds, and the reliance of its economy on trade with the rest of the EU. Several studies of the EU referendum vote have identified the importance of local economic context, demographic composition, and economic and cultural shocks, in explaining the result. An interesting and as yet unresolved question is the extent to which the vote can be explained by the interaction between different identities (Welsh, English, and European), and the local context. We analyse this interaction using British Election Survey data collected in June/July 2016, and a semi-parametric matching estimator. Our results show that after controlling for economic context and shocks, individuals with strong Welsh or English identities were significantly more likely to vote Leave, while those with less strongly defined national identities, and those with a Welsh identity linked specifically to the Welsh Language, were more likely to vote Remain. We also find that individuals with strong English identities residing in Wales were as likely to vote Leave as those remaining in England, while individuals with strong English identities resident in Scotland were significantly less likely to vote Leave.