Tali Noy Hindi (p)

Globalization and technological changes positively affect the Israeli economy growth. However, it deeper the spatial inequality between the center and the Israeli periphery and even create a 'dual-economy' phenomena.
Furthermore, the institutional structure of the Israeli governance system is characterized by administrative dysfunction of government ministries and local authorities in solving complex problems and providing quality services to the residents in the periphery. These mega-trends lead to deprivation feelings and disaffection among residents and communities in Israel.
Since 2008, the Ministry of Interior has been promoting a new strategy known as the 'New Regionalism for Israel' aimed at encouraging regional development and promoting voluntary collaborations (inspired by the French Communauté de Communes model) between local authorities. This initiative has expanded to government piloting and resulting in legal recognition.
Against this backdrop, Advisory Team of experts and researchers was formed in order to design a vision, policy alternatives and operational goals for a broad decentralization reform, which calls for a redistribution of authority, responsibility, and resources between the central government and subnational hierarchies.
One of the key tasks of the advisory team was to outline the geographical distribution of the new regional stratum. This work of territorial decentralization was done by a five-step methodology: (a) Choosing variables for GIS Data-layers (b) Analyzing & creating alternatives (c) Selection of criteria& Criteria Weight debate (d) scoring process (e) Debate & Decision.
Then another discussion was held, at the center of which was whether the chosen alternative would create an optimal balance between economies of scale and community needs, accessibility and cohesion.

Pascal Rey (p), Margot Petitpierre

In the framework of Conakry's infrastructural development, many development projects in the city induce involuntary displacements of city dwellers. The treatment of these people affected by urban projects varies widely depending on the source of the project funding.
Indeed, the moves generated by projects funded by the assistance of international institutions involve the respect of the Equator Principles, which ensure a continuous consideration of any person claiming a legitimacy of occupation of the land. At the opposite, urban development without any intervention of loans or support from international financial institutions leaves room to the strict application of the National Law and can lead to forced expropriations, whatever the status of the occupants.
The differences between situations of the displaced people after their move raise many questions about their treatment, which presents important paradoxes. On the one hand, people without the ability to prove their own, in the meaning of the National Land Code (absence of title) can benefit from a full coverage of their displacement. On the other hand, despite the existence of a land title, some are forcibly expropriated because their title is rendered obsolete by the fact that they occupy public land, often sold by the administration in the past, for the personal interests of the administrator.
These phenomena raise the question of the harmonisation of norms in the framework of displacement related to projects of national interest but more generally, ways of governance in the urban development and fears of States to see the application of the Equator Principles as a risk of increasing costs of any infrastructural project.
On the basis of concrete examples of infrastructural projects in Conakry, we will try to question the legitimacy of the concerns of these States to see in the application of international standards the risk of creating jurisprudence detrimental to urban development.

Matteo Basso (p), Paola Virgioli (p)

In recent years, Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) have been increasingly adopted by cities to provide public services and deliver public works and urban/territorial transformations. Despite the global diffusion of these tools, it is widely recognized – both in the scientific literature and in the public debates – that, as governance arrangements and funding schemes, PPPs are also affected by a number of controversial issues such as the optimal allocation of financial risks between public and private sectors, as well as the actual return on investment.
The lack of appropriate legal-technical competences for the formulation, within local authorities, of the public calls for tenders and the management of the entire project-cycle, as well as the standardized procedures (which are often indifferent to the physical and financial dimension of the interventions), have also led to the failure of some initiatives, frequently highlighting cases of irregular or not awarded tenders. In addition, the continuous changes of market conditions have reduced the attractiveness of PPPs, as some initiatives have been not adequately designed to adapt to a changing socio-economic scenario.
This contribution proposes a reflection on the state-of-the-art of the PPPs in the Veneto Region (Italy) through quantitative and qualitative methods. It presents and discusses the preliminary findings of a research project jointly conducted by the IUAV University of Venice and CRESME, the Italian centre for economic and social researches on the market of the building industry.
The quantitative analysis is based on a statistical and GIS elaboration of the official dataset provided by CRESME, which contains the PPPs’ public calls for tenders launched in the Veneto Region between 2009 and 2019. The research seeks, on the one hand, to understand the main socio-economic characteristics of the Municipalities that have adopted these tools; on the other, by considering only the awarded and the still ongoing calls for physical interventions, to explore the actual impact generated by the interventions both spatially and socio-economically.
The qualitative analysis, conducted with reference to a number of selected case-studies, is intended to gain knowledge on the main critical points and barriers faced by cities in designing and implementing urban policies through PPPs.

Holger Lischke (p), Lukas Naumann

Social conservation areas according to §172 para. 1 no. 2 of the German BauGB are being applied more and more in tense housing markets such as Berlin, Hamburg or Munich. This urban development instrument is closely linked to the introduction of a prohibition law (‘Umwandlungsverordnung’) in order to prevent the converting of rented apartments into condominiums in these areas. Also, the use of a pre-emptive right (‘Vorkaufsrecht’) to purchase a property at market value by the state or municipality, if a transaction occurs.
Our project addresses central questions of this policy for Berlin: How have purchase prices for real estate and condominiums in Berlin's social conservation areas developed in comparison to the city as a whole? What differences can be identified between the areas? What effects occur in urban districts nearby without conservation status? In addition to purchase prices, we also investigate the amount of condominiums in and around social conservation areas. We are also able to analyse how often a plot of land or a condominium has been part of a transaction.
Our longitudinal study for the years 1991 to 2019 is made possible by data from the Expert Committee for Property Values in Berlin. With the help of geographical information systems and open source data of the state of Berlin, we are able to isolate and spatially represent different interactions using statistical methods such as a difference-in-differences analysis.
Our project would like to contribute to the discourse on social conservation areas, which are regarded as the ultima ratio against improvement and displacement in federal states and municipalities. However, studies on real estate markets from other countries give cause for concern that a contrary effect is being achieved. In fact, measures that basically aim to preserve an urban district seem to lead to rising local prices in the end.