Prof. Marek Swistak (p)

In the current "transition era" of global economic order, the liberal trade system is under intense pressure from geopolitical rivalries and protectionism. Vulnerabilities within global value chains (GVCs), particularly in high-tech sectors like semiconductors and critical raw materials, have transformed economic interdependencies into tools of political and economic coercion. The central problem addressed is how regional entities can effectively manage these systemic vulnerabilities and reduce undesirable external dependencies without forfeiting their competitive advantages. This paper aims to identify the specific resources, actions, and mechanisms utilized by the European Union and Taiwan to enhance systemic resilience. By comparing these two distinct entities, the study identifies policy solutions that mitigate the risks of "weaponized" trade and determines how regional context shapes the success of diversification strategies.
The study employs Program Theory to evaluate the cause-and-effect logic of resilience policies, tracing the path from allocated resources (inputs) through strategic activities (actions) to systemic results (outcomes). Furthermore, it uses the "most different systems" comparative approach. Comparing the EU a transcontinental regulatory power with Taiwan a technologically critical island state allows the research to eliminate confounding variables and identify universal patterns of resilience in the face of global shocks.
The analysis processes a wide array of qualitative and quantitative data, including, strategic and legislative documents (e.g. The EU’s Critical Raw Materials Act, Chips Act, and the Internal Market Emergency and Resilience Act (IMERA)), institutional data (e.g. reports from Taiwan’s Ministry of Economic Affairs and the Industrial Technology Research Institute), investment figures, trade statistics, individual in-depth interviews with supply chain stakeholders
The paper argues that while both entities use state interventionism to mitigate risk, they adopt diverging regional models. The EU is consolidating a "regulatory fortress," prioritizing near-shoring and internal autonomy to revitalize its industrial base. Conversely, Taiwan is weaving a "security net" through "friend-shoring" investments (outward FDI in the US, Japan, and Germany) while strictly retaining its most advanced technological core on the island. Intermediary findings suggest that success is not defined by the sheer volume of instruments, but by the ability to rapidly reconfigure supply chains during a crisis. This study provides added value by demonstrating how different regional frameworks can achieve systemic resilience, offering a blueprint for navigating the "de-risking" era.

Prof. Olena Borzenko (p)

Global challenges of recent years have fundamentally changed the perception of stability, reliability and predictability of international political and economic processes. The COVID-19 pandemic, unprecedented in its scale and impact, has caused a chain reaction in the world economic system, exposing the vulnerability of even the most developed countries to disruption of logistical chains, lack of strategic resources and health crises.
In the new reality, signs of the collapse of the classical model of globalization, which envisaged the free movement of capital, goods, services and ideas, are becoming increasingly evident. It is gradually being replaced by a fragmented, ideologically and economically segmented world, where states increasingly resort to protectionism. All this is accompanied by growing distrust, intensifying competition for resources, and a revision of international obligations. There is a danger of a new "normality" based on situational alliances, power pressure, economic blackmail, and ignoring the principles of sustainable development.
Key signals indicating a potential change in the global economic model include: weakening the influence of global institutions and leveling the established "rules of the game"; active use of protectionist instruments; changing ethical norms in the international business environment; fragmentation of global interaction not only in the economic sphere, but also in the political, diplomatic and security spheres; application of political, diplomatic and information pressure to obtain preferences in access to natural resources, logistics and infrastructure networks; actual abandonment of climate policy goals - the desire for short-term economic benefits prevails over commitments to the "green transition", which is accompanied by ignoring environmental consequences. At present, these processes have not yet formed a complete and stable system, but are significant indicators of a possible institutional shift.
The use of geoeconomic levers in competitive struggle is an important aspect of geoeconomics. Geoeconomic tools help to understand the relationship between the economic strategies of countries and their geographical location, resources and spatial aspect, as well as to assess the impact of these factors on economic competition. Competitive struggle between countries and the use of economic levers in the context of global economic integration and globalization are used by all countries of the world, regardless of the level of development, to attract investment. In today's world, a new paradigm of interaction between developing countries and the world economy is being formed.

Prof. Kosyo Stoychev (p)

This paper proposes an economic-geographical framework for understanding regional performance in a transition era defined by a triple shift: green reindustrialization, digital phantomization, and geopolitical fragmentation. It argues that regions increasingly succeed not only through sectoral structure or cost advantages, but through their position in networks, the functions they perform within strategic flows, and the dependencies they accumulate or manage. Position is operationalised as network centrality and accessibility across transport, trade, innovation, and connectivity systems. Function is captured through role-based indicators that differentiate gateway regions, processing hubs, R&D nodes, and validation/compliance centres that mediate access to markets, standards, finance, and data. Dependence is measured as exposure to external energy inputs, critical technologies, finance and currency regimes, and regulatory or standard-setting power located outside the region.

Empirically, the study constructs a composite Position-Function-Dependence (PFD) profile for EU regions (NUTS2, with selected NUTS3 deep-dives) and tests its explanatory power against conventional predictors (GDP per capita, sectoral shares, investment intensity). The methodology combines index construction, network metrics, and spatial or panel regression to assess whether PFD configurations better account for differences in growth, resilience, and adjustment capacity during recent shocks. Two comparative “case windows” from Southeast Europe illustrate how regions can transition from production-based participation to node-like roles that capture higher value and greater strategic autonomy.

The results deliver a typology of regional roles in the triple transition and derive policy implications focused on upgrading functions, reducing harmful dependencies, and building institutional capacity to move from periphery to node.

Dr. Julia Kaczmarek-khubnaia (p)

In recent decades, global economies have increasingly experienced the negative effects of so-called global shocks. One of the most recent phenomena of this type, affecting countries' macroeconomic conditions and the functioning of international markets, was the outbreak of full-scale war in Ukraine. This conflict has revealed the specific nature of contemporary economic links, including the structure of global supply chains, which determine the scale of dependence and the strength of relations between the broadly defined highly developed countries of the West and the economies in transition.
The vast majority of European countries are feeling the negative consequences of the ongoing war. In the case of Georgia, however, the impact of this shock is more complex. External conditions, combined with the authorities' foreign policy decisions (including not joining the economic sanctions against Russia and de facto halting efforts to join the European Union), have contributed to several unexpected positive macroeconomic effects, including in foreign trade and direct investment inflows. From 2021, the year preceding the aforementioned shock, to 2024, GDP per capita in Georgia increased by over 80%.
In view of the above, this paper aims to analyse the impact of selected global shocks on Georgia's economic development process, using the concepts of path dependency and resilience as a theoretical framework. The condition of the Georgian economy during the period of shocks was assessed based on an analysis of the dynamics of selected macroeconomic indicators, including changes in gross domestic product, foreign direct investment, and foreign trade. To compare the specific impact of various shocks, the analysis covered both the COVID-19 pandemic and the period after the outbreak of full-scale war in Ukraine. To explain the identified processes and provide a broader historical context, important earlier events were also taken into account (including, for example, Georgia's breakout from the Soviet path of development in 1991).
The main conclusions include: (1) indicating the scale of the non-obvious positive effects of the recent global shock, and (2) identifying the nature of the reorientation of the directions and scale of Georgia's trade in the context of its international relations and internal conditions. The discussion of the results took into account the social context of the changes (protests and growing dissatisfaction among parts of society in the light of the growing authoritarian tendencies of the government).