Anna Bottasso (p), Maurizio Conti , Antonella Ferrara, Simone Robbiano

Guglielmo Cori

The focus of this study is to assess the causal impact of the connection of a local area to a high-speed rail network (HSR) on firms’ total factor productivity (TFP). The quasi-random location of the HSR station in the Italian city of Reggio Emilia is exploited in a Difference-in-Differences research design applied to a large sample of firms, observed over the period 2010-2018. The results suggest that the opening of the HSR station improved treated firms’ TFP by about 5%; in particular, such effect is larger for firms closer to the HSR station and slightly increases over the sample period. We also find that the impact of the connection to the HSR station is heterogeneous across industries and depends on firms’ size and past productivity. Overall results are robust to a large number of sensitivity checks and falsification tests.

Laurent Carnis (p)

Guglielmo Cori

see the extended abstract

Guglielmo Cori (p), Marco Di Cataldo

Anna Bottasso

Can a simple electoral rule influence politicians’ behavior? In Italian municipalities, a threshold of 15,000 inhabitants determines whether mayoral elections follow a single-round or a run-off system. But does this institutional shift affect the strategic choices of incumbent mayors seeking re-election? Existing literature highlights a transmission circuit linking electoral rules to political competition and, consequently, to policy outcomes. However, the extent to which these electoral mechanisms influence political behavior at the local level remains an open question. This study explores how electoral rules shape local policy decisions, specifically assessing whether incumbent mayors adjust their governance strategies in the years leading up to elections in response to differing electoral incentives. Do varying electoral environments prompt incumbents to strategically reallocate resources in order to strengthen their consensus and maximize their chances of re-election? Understanding these dynamics is crucial for evaluating the broader impact of institutional design on political accountability and efficiency in resource distribution. By examining municipalities’ impegni (future planned expenditures) and applying a regression discontinuity (RDD) approach around the 15,000-inhabitant threshold, this analysis investigates whether different electoral systems generate measurable differences in local choices. The objective is to identify systematic patterns that may enhance the likelihood of re-election for incumbent mayors, shedding light on the strategic behaviors that are induced by varying electoral frameworks.