Nikolaos Terzidis (p)

Kateryna Zabarina

This paper studies the role of trade globalization approximated by imports from China at the local level in shifting the electoral dynamics in Greek parliamentary elections over the 1996-2023 period. Accounting for time invariant unobserved confounding factors, our preliminary results depart from the political polarization impact from globalization; instead, we indicate that import competition is correlated with a shift towards extreme right parties, at the expense of extreme left ones. Using a more nuanced classification of political parties, we document positive relationships between trade exposure and support for both communist-socialist and social democratic parties, as opposed to a negative correlation with Christian democratic parties.

Anna Lewczuk (p), Kateryna Zabarina (p)

Paolo Veneri

In our paper we aim to analyse the geographical patterns of the spread of Polish voters’ tolerance for parties’ populist rhetoric and anti-EU position between the lower chamber elections in 2019 and 2023. Our particular focus is on the effect of the outburst of war in Ukraine in 2022 on the spread of the abovementioned attitudes.
For the purpose of our study we follow the definition of populism proposed by Mudde and Kaltwasser (2017) highlighting that it is “a thin-centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic camps, ‘“the pure people’” versus ‘“the corrupt elite,'” and which argues that politics should be an expression of the “‘volonté Générale’ (general will) of the people”.
To assess the impact of the war in Ukraine on the spread of voters’ tolerance for populist and anti-EU attitudes of political parties, we propose a spatial empirical model forecasted on a county level data in Poland. Based on the county level lower chamber election results and the Chapel Hill Expert Survey data we propose an index capturing the change in the intensity of voters’ tolerance for parties’ populist rhetoric and anti-EU position between the elections of 2019 and 2023 (the details on the index construction are presented in the paper). What is more, we proxy the impact of war in Ukraine on the voters’ perception of populism and anti-EU sentiments by accounting for the distance of a given county from the Polish-Ukrainian border. We aim to provide the answer to the following research question: Is the county’ proximity to the Polish-Ukrainian border correlated with voters’ tolerance for populist and anti-EU attitudes of political parties? What is the sign of a correlation?
To our best knowledge it is the first study focused on explaining the micro-scale populist/anti-EU voting patterns in Poland taking into account the impact of proximity to conflict in Ukraine and using the advanced spatial econometric models. Preliminary results suggest that distance is a significant factor for both voters’ tolerance for populist and anti-EU attitudes of political parties.

Nicola Pontarollo, Vicente Royuela, Paolo Veneri (p)

Pedro Fierro

This study assesses the contribution of individual and contextual characteristics in explaining life satisfaction inequalities within European cities. By drawing on a decomposition method based on Recentred Influence Function (RIF) regression, we shed light on the persistently higher inequalities and lower levels of life satisfaction observed in large cities compared to their smaller counterparts. We analyse 77 cities across Europe between 2012 and 2022, using four waves of the Quality of Life in European Cities' survey, whose samples are representative at the city level. We find that differences in the individual characteristics of the city population (i.e., composition effect) explain only a small part of the variation in life satisfaction inequality across cities. Most of the differences are captured by a structural effect, namely differences in the higher returns of specific individual characteristics (e.g., education) in large compared to small cities.

Pedro Fierro (p), Francisco Rowe , Andrés Rodríguez-Pose, Ellen Helsper

Giovanni Perucca

Social capital has historically been recognised as a pivotal dimension for gauging the vitality of democratic systems. In electoral terms, it has been perceived as a catalyst for voting behaviours, predominantly through its influence on civic participation and trust. Although social capital is usually viewed as a positive counterforce against populist movements, certain studies have underscored its dual nature, positing that under specific conditions, elevated levels of social capital might foster anti-establishment sentiments. Recognising the foundational studies of social capital, it becomes clear that the concept extends beyond a single dimension. This research adopts the well-established distinction between bonding social capital and bridging social capital, hypothesising that each type has distinct effects on political views. The aim is to explore the complex roles of different social capital forms in either reinforcing or undermining support for populist narratives in particular settings. Drawing on data from META and leveraging the methodologies recently introduced by Chetty et al. (2022a, 2022b), this study understands social capital across three dimensions: social connectedness, which measures interactions among individuals from diverse socioeconomic backgrounds; social cohesion, characterised by clusters of friendships and social networks; and civic engagement, indicated by volunteering rates and the existence of civic organisations within an area. This analysis suggests that social cohesion and civic engagement are indicative of bonding social capital, where interactions among individuals with similar backgrounds strengthen networks within tighter communities. Conversely, social connectedness represents bridging social capital, marked by diversity and interactions between different communities. Building on prior studies, this research hypothesises that the rise of populist narratives can be traced to enduring economic and demographic downturns in areas marked by significant levels of social capital. However, this study posits that the impact and relevance of social capital on populism might vary depending on the specific dimension of social capital being examined. Using Donald Trump's electoral performance in the 2016 presidential election as a case study, the results affirm the hypotheses. Bonding social capital is found to have a positive association with Trump's vote margins—serving as a proxy for populist narratives—while bridging social capital demonstrates a negative correlation. Additionally, an examination of interactions reveals a complex interplay among economic and demographic downturns, social integration, and political leanings, especially amid economic transformations. Through this investigation, the intricate interplay between social capital, territorial disparities, and political unrest is scrutinised.

Camilla Lenzi, Giovanni Perucca (p)

Nikolaos Terzidis

The recent upsurge of populist movements, typically associated with nationalist and authoritarian views, has been the object of a rich stream of literature, aimed at understanding the determinants of this phenomenon.
In their influential study, Dijkstra et al. (2020) associated the geography of (political) discontent to the individual dissatisfaction with one’s own life and, more specifically, with the opportunities provided in the community of residence. In this perspective, populist support is interpreted as the revenge of places (and people) that don’t matter.
Despite the rich evidence on the overlapping of political and life dissatisfaction, this is not the rule. Some studies, for instance, suggested a more complex interplay between the perception of one’s own life and the personal political behavior (Lenzi and Perucca, 2021). Recent empirical evidence showed that individuals and communities satisfied with their life may support populist parties, so as dissatisfied people may oppose populism (Lenzi and Perucca, 2023).
A clear identification of the joint geography of political and life dissatisfaction is still missing. Even more importantly, the understanding of the common (and different) determinants of these two sentiments is far from being achieved.
The present paper aims at providing an overview of the geography of political and life discontent in European regions over the last two decades. Moreover, it identifies the economic, social, institutional and cultural factors under which political and life dissatisfaction do not simultaneously occur, leading to deviations from the mainstream interpretation of populist voting.


References:
Dijkstra, L., Poelman, H., & Rodríguez-Pose, A. (2020). The geography of EU discontent. Regional Studies, 54(6), 737-753.
Lenzi, C., & Perucca, G. (2021). People or places that don’t matter? Individual and contextual determinants of the geography of discontent. Economic Geography, 97(5), 415-445.
Lenzi, C., & Perucca, G. (2023). The geography of life and political discontent in UK regions. Paper presented at the 64th SIE Conference.